The city is an elusive thing and our reaction is often to search for some object to which to compare it. We write and speak of cities as organisms or as containers, hoping that simplification will lead to comprehension. Language is used to build a bridge between limited knowledge and vast ignorance. And while such rhetorical ploys might be necessary that does not make them necessarily desirable.

That said as prologue, I want to begin with a quotation from the sociologist Robert Park. It appears at the end of his famous essay of 1916 titled “The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment.” The urban geographer Michael Dear, as you might know, labeled this essay “the basic primer of the Chicago School” (2002:iv). For Dear, the essay functions to highlight the differences between the Chicago and the Los Angeles School of Urbanism. My interest, though, is not with contesting this particular assertion but rather with the final sentence of Park’s essay (1916:612):

The city, in short, shows the good and evil in human nature in excess. It is this fact, perhaps, more than any other, which justifies the view that would make of the city a laboratory or clinic in which human nature and social processes may be conveniently and profitably studied.

Park’s claim that a city can be a laboratory appeared more recently in Robert Sampson’s very impressive book *Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect*. Early in the text, Sampson points out that his research uses “the
iconic city of Chicago as a laboratory” (2012:viii). A few pages later, he repeats this claim by noting that he took “as [his] laboratory the social landscape and continued vitality of Chicago” (2012:31). Sampson thereby positions himself in the Chicago School tradition that Robert Park, unbeknownst to him at the time, had engendered nearly one hundred years earlier.²

The notion that the city can be – and is -- a laboratory is heard frequently in urban planning and urban studies circles. Not one open house for prospective students of the Urban Planning Program at Columbia University ends without at least one planning professor announcing that the faculty considers New York City to be its laboratory. Whether meant as an empirical claim or simply metaphorically, it is a deeply flawed idea. It distorts the kind of research that is actually done in and on cities, and, it misrepresents the city as a research site.

Consider the kind of research associated with laboratories. In laboratories, scientists conduct experiments. They inject mice with a potential antibody, subject a new steel alloy to a tensile stress test, or gauge the response rate of humans to visual signals. In an experiment, the scientist controls the timing and intensity of treatment, isolates subjects, and cordons them off from influences that might sever the causal path between stimulus and response. This hardly describes the urban research that appears in the Journal of Urban Affairs, Urban Studies, or the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Most urban research is decidedly non-experimental.

A number of urban researchers, however, are intent on replicating the experiment, albeit in other realms. Their hero is the psychologist and methodologist Donald Campbell.

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² I suspect that Park had numerous examples of laboratories at the University of Chicago from which to draw inspiration, not the least being the historical example of John Dewey’s laboratory school established in 1886 to develop a new pedagogy of experience-based education (Westbrook, 2005:74-6).
who devoted much of his scholarly work to relocating the experiment to non-laboratory settings. Committed to it “as the only way of establishing a cumulative tradition in which improvements can be introduced without the danger of faddish discard of old wisdom in favor of inferior novelties” (Campbell and Stanley, 1963:2), Campbell was also committed to research that contributed directly to the improvement of society. He wanted scientists to advise policy and to base their advice on systematic social experimentation. To that end, he advocated an experimenting society that “would vigorously try out possible solutions to recurrent problems and would make hard-headed, multidimensional evaluations of outcomes,” mounting other alternatives when evaluations showed prior interventions to be ineffective or harmful (Campbell, 1998:37).

Social research intended to advise policy, however, cannot be done in laboratories. In laboratories, experiments lack what Campbell calls external validity. Made manageable so as to conform to the rules of experimentation, they become less real and thus less suited to real-world application. Nevertheless, Campbell fully understood the way in which experiments prevent threats to internal validity and thereby guard against alternative explanations which might undermine scientific claims. Consequently, he developed and became an advocate for quasi-experimental designs that approximate the virtues of the laboratory while operating outside of it. His approach does not, however, make the city a laboratory. In fact, it explicitly recognizes that this is a false analogy.

Park’s formulation also fails to appreciate what kind of place a laboratory is. The many different sites where research occurs are not simply substitutes for each other. It matters where research is done. The sociologist Thomas Gieryn (2006) is quite helpful in
this regard, particularly in matching where research takes place to that research’s credibility. Recognizing that dissimilar places of research have different epistemic virtues, Gieryn writes of them as truth-spots, places where scientific claims are legitimized. A laboratory is one such place. It has distinctive qualities that engender social acceptance for the findings which were produced there. An experiment in a laboratory has an exalted position in scientific and popular imagination. In a laboratory, we find precautions against contamination, professionally-trained researchers, systematic procedures, and careful documentation. The scientific method interacts with the isolation and sterility of the laboratory to enhance the objectivity of the researcher and make him or her seem untainted and unbiased. This is hardly a description of the city.3

Underlying Gieryn’s argument is that scholarly production has multiple truth-spots, multiple places where research might be done and be credible. A quotation from the world-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein (1996:15), taken from one of his writings on the rise of academic disciplines, provides an apt illustration. Wallerstein is discussing history as a scholarly practice:

Furthermore, the historian, like the natural scientist, was not suppose to find his data in prior writings (the library, locus of reading) or in his own thought processes (the study, locus of reflection) but rather in a place where objective, external data could be assembled, stored, controlled, and manipulated (the laboratory …., locus of research).

I must confess that I modified the quotation. In the original, Wallerstein uses the phrase “the laboratory[slash]the archive,” as if equating the two. This is simply wrong, the laboratory and the archive are much different types of truth-spots.

3 I recognize that “the laboratory” is not a single on unchanging place of scientific truth-making. See, for example, Galison (1997) on the historical changes in the places where physics is done.
Gieryn’s (2006) alternative to the laboratory is the field-site. The field-site is not a confined, isolated, controlled, and sterilized place but a place in the “real” world: a shopping mall, a neighborhood, a recycling plant, the offices of the economic development agency. The field site has qualities that are different from the laboratory, but still capable of conferring credibility on the research that is done there. Doing research in the field situates the researcher inside that which is being studied. Enveloped by the gritty details of life as actually lived, she engages the world on its own terms. There, the researcher is also vulnerable to the unexpected. The researcher claims “I went to Flint, Michigan, and observed the demolition of homes, met with the director of the land bank in his office, and talked with local residents.” The researcher asserts “I was there.” The implication is that the evidence was directly experienced by the researcher. The findings were derived from an authentic engagement with the world and this becomes the basis for their credibility. Findings that are real are findings that are valid. The field-site thus confers legitimacy on the research but not in the same way that happens in the laboratory. The city as a truth-spot, of course, is more like a field-site.

Interestingly, scholars of the early Chicago School did most of their research in the field. This leads Gieryn to suggest that Park’s claim is not to be taken literally. Rather, it should be read as the belief that Chicago could be a “laboratory specimen, amenable to measurement, dissection, experiment, and other contrivances” (Gieryn, 2006:10). Park himself was hopeful that social science would move from mere observation of to experimentation in the city. (I suspect Donald Campbell’s methodological innovations would have made Park quite happy.) Of course, thinking of the city as a specimen is much different from thinking of it as a laboratory.
Not all urban research occurs in the field; much of it takes place in the faculty offices, seminar rooms, and research centers of universities. Many urban researchers never walk the streets of the neighborhoods that they study or ride elevators to interviews. These researchers are removed from the field. They collect their data-sets from web-based sources and analyze them in their offices, places that also have epistemic virtues. Distant from the daily life of the city, they are less subject to ontological noise and recalcitrant informants. At the same time, university offices are not as sterile as laboratories and are more compromised by competing activities -- for example, counseling graduate students. The legitimacy of the research stems from the aura of the university as a place of scholarship and objectivity.

If you are counting, we now have three truth-spots for urban research: laboratories, field-sites, and university offices.

Let us return to Robert Sampson and his book *Great American City*. In it, he not only claims to treat Chicago as his laboratory but also suggests that Chicago can be a “lens through which to view contemporary American cities” (2012:20). This adds another way to think about a city as a research object. But, what does this really mean? Is it a statement about empirical possibilities, as the laboratory analogy seems to be, or is it a metaphor; that is, a useful rhetorical formulation.

Think about a lens. A lens is an aid to sight; it enhances what we would normally see with the “naked eye,” itself a variable standard. A lens makes things look bigger (or smaller) and thus closer (or further away), widens our angle of vision, brings what we see into sharper focus, or (with fish-eye lens) distorts what the eye would see. A lens mediates between us and another way of seeing. It filters reality. To this extent, a lens is
not a window. A window is an intermediary; that is, “it transports … meaning without transformation” (Latour, 2005:39). A lens, because it changes what we see and how we see it, is a mediator. Mediators “transform, translate, distort, and modify … meaning” (Latour, 2005:39).

Sampson’s comment suggests that Chicago can help us to understand other cities. What he does not comment on is that thinking of Chicago (that particular city) as a lens mediates what we would have seen, or understood, in the absence of looking through it. Detroit seen through the lens of Chicago is going to look quite unlike Detroit seen through the lens of Los Angeles. Moreover, we give up something peculiar to Detroit when we use Sampson’s Chicago lens. Consequently, to borrow phrasing from James Scott (1998), I am not convinced that “seeing like Chicago or Los Angeles” is all that helpful. Too many questions remain unaddressed. Do only some cities and not others need such mediators? How would I know if my city requires an interpretive boost? Who decides what city becomes the master mediator?

The metaphor of the lens, of course, privileges the act of seeing and this has implications for how we represent cities. Consider, for example, the “bird’s eye view.” The bird’s eye view is a view from above and from a distance and gives the false impression of a “total vision” (Pinto, 1976:35). It functions to remove the observer from the messy reality on the ground and suggests an omnipotent and controlling figure who is doing the seeing. The view from afar (for example, through a telephoto lens) holds out the promise of representation without the contamination of reactivity.

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4 Harris (2000:311) describes a lens as selectively focusing our vision on particular objects. It also amplifies certain qualities of objects.
Consider a more obvious example of “viewing through a lens” -- the case of what is called “ruins porn.” This is a critique of Camilo Jose Vergara, Andrew Moore, and Yves Marchand and Romain Meffre, photographers who portray the decay and destruction of shrinking cities, specifically Detroit (Matler, 2011; Rubin, 2012). Two accusations are made against their work. One is that ruins are represented without any accompanying acknowledgment of the struggles and accomplishments achieved by existing and past residents. That is, the record is partial and biased. The second is that the ruins are being aestheticized as if the public troubles of these cities were mere objects to be taken into the world of art. Seeing becomes problematic, in both these instances, and while the ruins porn critique is not central to my rejection of the lens metaphor, it cannot be ignored in thinking about the claim that a city is a lens.

More than the city as laboratory, the metaphor of the lens points to issues of language and representation. Back in 1980, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson wrote of the importance of metaphors to how we think about and experience reality. Metaphors focus our attention, form categories that enable distinctions and, because they are generative, make other meanings available to us. We can hardly speak or write without calling on one or another metaphor. With metaphors in hand, we grapple with ideas that are difficult to express, and hope to convey, albeit crudely, our tacit knowledge. Approximate, we are nonetheless understood.

The city is one of these ideas. Because it eludes characterization, it is a prime target for metaphorical displacement (Duncan, 1996; Shields, 1996). You are all familiar with the city as machine, the city as a living organism, and, more recently, the city as

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5 Their respective books are New American Ghetto (Rutgers University Press, 1995), Detroit Disassembled (Art Publications, 2010), and The Ruins of Detroit (Steidl, 2010). To this list might be added Juliet Reyes Taubman’s Detroit: 138 Square Miles (Museum of Contemporary Art, 2011).
cyborg (Gandy, 2005). Each gives structure to our thinking about the city, and, in doing so, each also alters the city. The experimental physicist Werner Heisenberg years ago pointed out that to measure or observe a thing is to change it. Asking a question influences what the respondent thinks about the topic, using a lens creates an object with different qualities, and characterizing a city metaphorically changes the city from previous representations.

My concern is with one, particular rhetorical formulation that can be used to think about and characterize the city. I am thinking of the use of synecdoche; that is, the replacement of a less inclusive term by a more inclusive term, as when we characterize Police Office Krupke as “the law.” One does not have to read too deeply into the urban literature to find examples of this. In a 1997 article, Ash Amin and Stephen Graham noted that many urban theorists isolate an aspect of the city and allow it to stand for – to represent -- the city as a whole. Theorists, they wrote, “assert[s] the primacy of certain dynamics within contemporary urban life … whilst others [other dynamics] never make it into the theorist’s or practitioner’s analysis at all” (1997:6). The city is characterized as a command-and-control center, a learning city, a city of immigrants, or a just city. Such a rhetorical move ignores both the heterogeneity of cities and their commonplace qualities. The result is partial explanations and interpretations. The urban researcher searches for what makes the city special rather than trying to understand the city in its multiplicity, much as Detroit is characterized as a shrinking city in a way that hides the fact that most
of its residents live quite ordinary lives. Amin and Graham’s complaint is that a part of the city is insufficient for knowing all of the city.\(^6\)

I want to take this implicit comparison in a different direction by changing the terms of reference from the city itself to larger networks of cities. Instead of thinking of Detroit, say, in terms of specific qualities (for example, population loss or race), what if instead we asked how Detroit fits into – is an aspect of – a network of cities. The value of this approach is that it recognizes that cities should not be studied in isolation; they are not autonomous entities. To this extent, researchers could treat any specific city as a portal – another metaphor – into a wider arena of urban dynamics and conditions. We would conceive of Detroit or Chicago or Los Angeles as one node in an urban network and ask how it functions to make that network coherent and meaningful. This is, of course, a veiled call for greater recognition of uneven geographical development.

Similarly, one might view the city as standing for the whole of capitalism, as in the writings of Mike Davis and the early Manuel Castells (Duncan, 1996:259).

Thinking of synecdoche in this way leads us to posit the city as “a case.” When the city is treated as a case, one is studying not a condition or an event within the city but the city as a whole. A case is a singular and complete object. Most urban research, of course is not about the city as an object but rather about things that happen within the city; for example, crime in Philadelphia, informality in Johannesburg, or municipal finance in San Diego. What the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973:22) once wrote in reference to anthropology also applies to most of urban studies: “The locus of the study is

\(^6\) Jennifer Robinson (2006) mounts this argument on a larger canvas and takes to task global city and mega-city theorists for discarding what is ordinary about these cities and ignoring cities which do not fit these categories.
not the object of the study. Anthropologists don’t study villages …; they study in villages” (emphasis in original).

Treating the city as a case obliges the researcher to answer the question -- “what is it a case of?” The usual response is to propose one or another category. For example, Detroit could be a case of cities with once-dominant industries, a case of port cities, or a case of cities with violent racial histories. In each instance, the claim is that the city is representative or typical of a category; that is, shares similar conditions or dynamics. The researcher, of course, must make the commonalities (and differences) explicit in a way that enables the rest of us to understand how this city can “stand in for” and thereby elucidate the larger category. The promise is that knowing this one city will provide insights that can be applied to the others.

What if, though, the researcher considers the city “special,” neither unique nor merely representative? Here is where the sociologist Neil Brenner (2003) is particularly useful. Brenner distinguishes among three types of cases: stereotypical, prototypical, and archetypical. The stereotypical case is the one I have been discussing; that is, the city as a typical case symptomatic and congruent with the conditions and forces operating in the other cities in the category. This approximates the Weberian ideal or pure type. It only approximates it because Max Weber meant such a case as a theoretical construct, a fiction, and a conceptual tool, not a real case.7

A prototypical case is different; it is the first instance of the general category. So, for example, one might argue that Detroit was the original, shrinking city and that subsequent shrinking cities will evolve similarly. The Los Angeles School has made this

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7 The geographer Jan Nijman (2006) some years ago seemed to have violated this stricture when he defined a paradigmatic city as one “display[ing] fundamental traits and trends of the urban system more clearly than do other cities (2000:135) and proposed Miami as such a paradigm.
claim for its city – Los Angeles as the harbinger for future metropolitan development in the United States. Another example comes from a former mayor of Newark, New Jersey, Kenneth Gibson, who, on his election in 1970 said “Wherever American cities are going, Newark will get there first.”

Brenner’s third type of case is the archetypical city. This city is a unique or exceptional case within the general category and often appears in the literature as a “city of superlatives” (Beauregard, 2003); that is, a city that has the most of something (for example, languages spoken), is the fastest growing or declining, ranks the highest on some category (for example, the greatest expanse of vacant, previously occupied land), or was the first to do something (for example, privatize its water system) with this last quality portraying the city as both archetypical and prototypical.

Thinking of cities as special cases is the underlying (and often explicit) premise of the desire to create a city-based school of urbanism. But, are individual cities really the appropriate basis for schools?

A school, for the purposes of this discussion, is a group of individuals whose work is organized, or understood to be organized, around a specific understanding of the world that differentiates them from other individuals in their field. Thus we can distinguish pragmatist philosophers from analytical philosophers, be-bop jazz musicians from those who play rhythm-and-blues, the Ash Can School of painters from abstract impressionists, and social theorists of the Frankfurt School from rational choice theorists.

In the urban literature, and for decades, it has been understood that there is a Chicago

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8 Apologies to Thomas Gieryn. When I began this paper, I knew I wanted to include his ideas, but it was not until the third draft or so when I went back to his (2006) article to make sure I had interpreted him correctly that I realized that this paper and his article have the same narrative arc – from laboratory to school. My hope is that Professor Gieryn considers the sincerest form of flattery to be imitation.
School associated with an ecological perspective. In the 1990s, the Los Angeles School – postmodern to its roots – emerged to displace the prototypical city-based school as well as challenge the non-school of Marxist-inclined, urban political economists. And, a few years ago, scholars in Chicago and New York began to speak of schools named after their city, believing that having found affinities they had also founded a school. Debate is also underway here at the University of Michigan and a recently-announced panel for the annual meetings of the AAG proposed to discuss “the potential classification of Berlin as a ‘school of urban research’.”

This is inappropriate for urban studies. In a recent critique of the notion of city-based schools such as Los Angeles, New York, Chicago II (really III or maybe IV, but that is another story (Becker, 1999), I argued that they are intellectually flawed (Beauregard, 2011). City-based schools conflate uniqueness and difference, they embrace a form of naturalism that elevates naïve realism over issues of representation, they fail to understand the social constructionist qualities of their project, they violate contemporary understandings of time and space by treating the city as outside history and as dis-embedded from networks of cities (thereby falling victim to a flawed sense of place), and they undermine theoretical pluralism by arguing that theorists of the contemporary city must use their city as a lens. This last point is also a point about power; that is, power defined as the ability to convince others to see the world as you do.

To this, I might add another criticism. I recently read an essay on monopoly rent by the Marxist geographer David Harvey (2012). Monopoly rent exists when an actor has exclusive control over a tradable commodity and, because of this, is able to extract a higher income stream than if he or she lacked that control. The concept is usually
associated with commodities that are unique and non-replicable. For example, you might own a piece of land in the path of a city’s new light-rail line, the only house in the United States designed by a world-famous architect, one of Charlie Parker’s alto saxophones, or a signed copy of J.D. Salinger’s *Catcher in the Rye*. Of course, a market has to exist for these commodities, and the monopoly rent you might extract from the transit authority for your land is likely to be limited by the threat or application of eminent domain.

My point should be obvious. Advocates of city-based schools are attempting to create a scholarly form of monopoly rent. Implicit in their arguments is that this one city is unique and non-replicable – either prototypical or archetypical – and thus those who “own” it – that is, study it or hold membership in the school – have special scholarly status as a result. That is, the claim to a school is an attempt to position that city as rare and then to reap the benefits of possessing knowledge about it.

As scholars, we do this all of the time, “this” being the attempt to distinguish ourselves from other scholars in our field. The process begins with the dissertation when we ask doctoral students what unique contribution their dissertations will make. Originality is simply highly prized in academia (Guetzkow, Lamont, and Mallard, 2004), and even though it is poorly understood, it is nonetheless an important part of the discussions we have not only with doctoral students but also during deliberations on promotion and tenure, when doing peer-reviews of journal articles, and upon advising publishers whether or not to offer a book contract to an aspiring author. Consequently, we should not be surprised when this tendency to “branding” and monopoly rent appears among those who research and study specific cities.
All said, there is one way I would accept the existence of a city-based school and thus one way in which it makes sense to me. That way requires us to think of a school not as organized around a specific city as a privileged object but rather to distinguish between schools of “activity” and schools of “thought” (Becker, 1999; Gilmore, 1988). This distinction was developed by the sociologist Samuel Gilmore. Schools of activity are comprised of people who work together on practical projects, but might not share a methodological orientation, disciplinary commitments, or theoretical leanings. For example, a number of people around the world do research on shrinking cities. They are economists, political scientists, urban planners, and geographers and some work with community groups, others rely on secondary data to analyze population change and housing markets, and still others interview and consult with local officials. Together, they constitute a “shrinking city” school of activity. Yet, on many issues (for example, the potential for aggregate growth or the appropriate role of the central government), they disagree.

Schools of thought are different; they are comprised of people who share specific ideas, whether it is a disciplinary perspective such as anthropology or a theoretical orientation such as actor-network theory or urban political ecology. These researchers might or might not study the same object. For example, actor-network theorists do research on forests in Brazil, stalled construction projects in New York City, and informal parking arrangements in inner-city Naples. Moreover, and unlike schools of activity, schools of thought are less likely to announce themselves as a school. Recognition is conferred from the outside.
To take a single city as the object of a school of activity strikes me as perfectly acceptable. No attempt is made to impose a theoretical point-of-view or to elevate the city to mythical status. In effect, what the members of this school are saying is “We all do research in and on this city and, at times, we collaborate.” Announcing such a “school” would be beside the point. Doing so would only give a false impression and might be interpreted – by some – as a shameless attempt to procure monopoly rent.

To take a city as the basis of a school of thought, however, is simply wrong. A city is neither an argument nor a point-of-view.

What I have attempted to do in this talk today is to offer alternative ways to think about the city. I do not believe that a city can be a school of thought, though it can be a school – or better, a site – of activity. No city is a paradigm; that is a conceit that we should avoid. Cities can be prototypes, but extrapolating from their origins to other cases is fraught with difficulties that border on the insurmountable. Neither do I think a city can be an exceptional case, an archetype. Casting a city as a stereotype is fine as long as the one doing the casting does not drift into realm of ideal-types – they are fictions. The city can be a case within a larger category. It can be a field-site. To propose the city as a laboratory stretches the meaning of that term beyond what someone like me – a language prescriptivist – can tolerate. If a city is a lens, it distorts how we think about other cities.

I understand the impulse to simplify and I am fine with the desire to engage in metaphorical re-writings. However, to do so without reflecting on how this changes what we find important and know about the city is simply bad scholarship. The city is many things, but there are many things it should not be.
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