As a consequence of an increasingly urbanizing world migrants head primarily to cities, especially the globalized metropolises. Cities provide better prospects for income generation; they concentrate most support networks which are so crucial to incoming migrants; they are the main entry points to destination countries; and are information hubs on existing opportunities.

Through the scientific contribution of individual authors, SSIIM Paper Series intends to disseminate research results on the urban dimension(s) of international migration, both in cities of the global North and of the South.
URBAN CITIZENSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY IN CITIES IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Kaja Kühl
This paper discusses the spatial and social consequences of developing an urban society in which the majority of its population is denied a right to citizenship. It documents the spatial practices of exclusion that are used in accommodating this group and calls into question the sustainability of such growth over the long term.

The cities of the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai are among the fastest growing cities in the Middle East. Most of this growth is enabled by the work of migrants from South Asia, who constitute a stunning 89% of the population in the UAE. Until recently planning and development policies have given little attention to housing, transportation and other services for the migrant population. Following pressures by international human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch reports 2006, 2009), the urban governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai as well as the national government have shifted towards recognition of this population and developed policies to provide housing and basic services. However, spatial segregation paired with immigration policies limit the migrants’ right to the city, to participate in, contribute to, and benefit from the urban culture that is being created by their own labour.

Scholars frequently discuss the notion of the right to the city as the right to public space in relationship to homelessness (Harvey, 2005) or the right to protest in public space (Harvey, 2012). In recent years, the right to the city concept has been used to guide the debate on policies that combine urban development with social equity, human rights and justice (Colin, 2005). This paper builds on these debates and examines the right to urban life in the framework of Lefebvre’s sense of the ‘lived space’ and what he also calls the right to public space in Abu Dhabi (Lefebvre, 1968).

While the great majority of the population in Abu Dhabi are citizens of the country in which they reside, they are legal residents of the country and city and therefore citizens of the city in Lefebvre’s understanding of the ‘lived space’. The paper focuses specifically on policies for low-income workers, who work in construction, landscaping, security and maintenance. National immigration policies deny citizenship and limit family reunion, emphasizing the temporary status of these workers and discouraging long-term social and material investments in the host city. Local planning
policies further segregate the working class migrant from participating in urban society in the place of residence by requiring housing to be built at great distance from other residential districts. In addition to field research conducted during a visit to Abu Dhabi and Dubai in 2011, this paper draws from a review of planning documents and regulations, a review of policy papers on labour migration to the Gulf States and from international reports and literature on human rights and the right to the city.

It discusses current models of citizenship at the level of the nation state and the expanded understanding of the term to include the concept of urban citizenship in the context of labour migration to the United Arab Emirates. Given the large number of foreigners living under challenging conditions within the borders of the UAE, questions of local identity arise as well as questions of human rights violations. This paper suggests the “Right to the City” concept as a useful framework to address both questions, deliberately plan for the urban inclusion of all citizens and build a robust urban culture.

Introduction

One of the highest concentrations of international migrants can be found in the six Gulf States Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. With only 0.4% of the world’s population, they host 13% of the world’s migrant population. Great wealth as a result of vast oil discoveries in the Persian Gulf in the middle of the 20th century, small population and labour shortages can characterize all these countries. The United Arab Emirates is the second largest of the six after Saudi Arabia. It is a federal monarchy, comprised of seven individual emirates, whose rulers have sole sovereignty over interior affairs of their emirate, while the national government has sovereignty over foreign affairs, immigration and labour law. Dubai and Abu Dhabi are the two wealthiest and largest of the seven emirates. While in most cases, the names Dubai and Abu Dhabi refer to the cities of the same name in these emirates, both emirates have larger territories than the city proper. Especially Abu Dhabi has a substantial hinterland and smaller cities within its emirate. Scales of policies overlap between state, emirate and city. Given the political structure where the ruler of Abu Dhabi is also the president of the country, the differences between state and local jurisdiction or state and local interests are not always clear.

In 2010 the National Bureau of Statistics estimated the total number of foreigners in the United Arab Emirates to be 7.35 million or 88.5% of the total population. Reports suggest that an additional 10% of the total population are undocumented migrants living in the country (Kapiszewski, 2001). This proportion of local to foreign population is unique in the world and calls into question the delineation between local and foreign, citizens and non-citizens and the policies in place to define the line that separates them and the rights afforded to either group as urban citizens.

Concepts of citizenship

Since its creation in 1971, the United Arab Emirates reserves a set of exclusive rights to its citizens that reflect its unique condition as a small state with enormous natural resources paired with traditional leadership, whose goal it is to share this wealth (but not political power) with its small population and develop it into a modern state and society. Unlike most developed countries, which generated wealth through industrialization (often with the support of migrant labour), the United Arab Emirates generates industrialization through its wealth as a way of securing its future post-oil. As early as the formation of the new federal state, the governing rulers were acutely aware of the dangers of their dependency on international oil demand. The unpredictability of the oil price, changing global energy consumption and the introduction of new energy sources elsewhere all posed threats to this revenue that could lead to structural problems and underdevelopment. As part of the strategy much of the oil revenue is being invested overseas (the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is estimated to be the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world leading Norway, China and Saudi Arabia).1 Diversification of the economy was an important goal since the 1970s and is the second important strategy to secure the continuous wealth of the country.

Figure 1: Population Growth 1975-2005

Source: UAE National Bureau of Statistics, Censuses

Since the 1970s, the UAE have expanded in manufacturing, agriculture, health, education, financial services and tourism sectors. Oil revenue now accounts for only 6% of Dubai’s GDP. Dubai’s oil reserves are much smaller than Abu Dhabi’s and are expected to be completely depleted by 2016. Therefore, Dubai was under much greater pressure to utilize the oil...
Given this insatiable demand for foreign labour, the UAE might have contemplated provisions for permanent migration and a path to citizenship. However, a significant characteristic of this migration pattern is the perception of impermanence by all participants. The governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai are planning the expansion of these cities for a population that will triple in size assuming that new neighbourhoods and new businesses will be filled with Emiratis. The presence of foreign workers is a temporary means to an end. Immigration policies, which limit typical visas to two years with the option to renew, reflect this thinking as much as urban planning policies, which do not contemplate plans to permanently house blue-collar workers and their families. Similarly, the migrants themselves view their presence as temporary. Most invest their earnings in their country of origin, have families and social networks there, and return eventually.

The 2005 census shows a large percentage of the foreign population staying less than 4 years. On the other hand, 25% of the non-national population had been in the country for 10 years or more, a number that is still significantly higher than the total immigrant population in most countries. According to Abu Dhabi’s Statistical Yearbook more non-nationals were born in 2011 than nationals despite policies that encourage family planning for nationals and the discouraging ratio of 3 male to 1 female non-nationals residing in the country. Under current law, these children will lose their right to residency as a dependent of a non-national at the age of 21 for males or at the time of their marriage for females. Our knowledge about the role of migration or concepts of integration and citizenship as observed and experienced in traditional immigrant countries such as the United States, Canada or Australia seems inadequate to analyse many aspects of the unique situation of the demographic imbalance in the Gulf countries. However, experiences of second generation immigrants in France or “Dreamers” in the United States allow us to speculate that this growing number of Emirati-born Non-nationals will be one of the distinct groups likely to rise up and demand access to citizenship.

What then exactly does it mean to be a citizenship of the UAE and its largest cities, Abu Dhabi and Dubai? How is it constructed and how is this construct denied to the majority of people living within its territory? In its broadest sense citizenship involves rights, responsibilities and membership in a political community of some kind (Brown, 1994 cited in Purcell 2002). In Europe, the key definition of a political community was originally the city, both in ancient Greek and medieval cities which granted privileges and obligations to its citizens and negotiated forms of exclusion and inclusion to delineate citizens from other subjects (Sassen, 2008). The modern Western understanding of citizenship based on the Westphalian system* of territoriality imagines one’s primary political community to be the nation-state that is embedded in an international system of nation-states, each of which is sovereign within its territory. Citizenship is thus often used

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2. According to the Abu Dhabi Statistical Yearbook 2011, 15,820 non-national children were born in Abu Dhabi in 2010 compared to 13,497 nationals.

3. “Dreamers” refers to undocumented immigrants, who were brought to the United States as children under age 16. The name refers to the “Dream Act” a legislative proposal that would grant these children a conditional path to citizenship.

4. The Westphalian system refers to the peace of Westphalia in 1648, which is by many considered to be the origin of the modern, Western international system of states based on two concepts: territoriality and the absence of a role for external agents in domestic structures.
children of Emirati men in keeping they reach the age of women married to foreigners will be government issued a decree under 5. with tribal understanding of in Emirati women marrying citizens-1.983346 candidates meet conditions for uae- ae/government/about-5-000http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/u foreignerto cement family bonds in Emirati February 15 2012%.

Until then, federal state of the United Arab Emirates and is deeply rooted in the regionstribal culture. The concept of state and territorial authority was a political community based on ancestry precedes the forming of the new successor states, the movement of refugee population and the codification of international human rights norms have prompted increasing recognition of citizenship as a transnational matter (Turner and Isin, 2003). Saskia Sassen argues that citizenship is an incomplete concept that has actively been constructed over the past centuries and continues to evolve under the pressures of globalization (Sassen, 2008).

The United Arab Emirates practice jus sanguinis. Citizenship and therefore inclusion into the political community is granted to those who are born to Emirati parents and are commonly referred to as ‘Nationals’. Anyone born to parents, who are not Nationals does not have the right to Emirati citizenship and is commonly referred to as ‘Non-National’ or ‘Expatriate’, regardless of place of birth or length of stay. This practice of belonging to a political community based on ancestry precedes the forming of the federal state of the United Arab Emirates and is deeply rooted in the regions tribal culture. The concept of state and territorial authority was largely foreign to the region's traditional politics, given the vagueness of mostly worthless desert land and tribal structures (Davidson, 2005).

Frauke Heard-Bey argues that even by the mid-twentieth century the establishment of a territorial state with distinct physical boundaries was still very much “out of tune with the traditional conduct of local politics given that sovereignty over people was far from permanently binding, let alone sovereignty over territory” (Heard-Bey, 1982 cited in Davidson, 2005). Prior to the formation of nation states the area of the lower gulf was occupied by a series of Bedouin tribes, loosely bound to specific territory, but more importantly bound by ancestry and tribal relations. Tribes thought of themselves as giant lineages, traced through the male line, from some eponymous ancestor. Each lineage divided into tribal segments, which subdivided into clans, which in turn divided into sub-clans, and so on, down to families. Tribes were governed by a sheikh or “elder”. This political system is still in practice today, where each emirate is governed by a hereditary ruler and political positions and property is distributed based on one’s direct lineage to the ruler. Climate and geography reinforced this notion of fluid, mobile and non-territorial economic, social and political structure. The harsh environment of the desert and the shortage of fertile land prevented many families from permanent settlement and instead forced a semi-nomadic life. Families would tend to their livestock or date palm orchards during the winter months, but would move to the cooler coastal villages during summer for fishing and pearling. As a result territorial borders were often fluid and vague as tribes moved about and the desert did not offer geographic features that marked territory.

The United Arab Emirates now finds itself in a unique position, where according to this non-territorial system, the majority of the population living in its territory is excluded from membership in its political community and does not enjoy the rights and responsibilities as citizens of the nation-state. A number of policies and practices segregate citizens and non-citizens, transcending the various scales from national to emirate to urban, often overlapping. Apart from immigration regulations that restrict the right of non-citizens to permanently reside in the country (and will be described in more detail in the following pages), the most significant difference from most other countries is the citizen’s right to receive property from the state. The first president of the UAE created a generous welfare system intended to share the wealth from its oil and natural gas resources with its citizens. Under the programme every male citizen receives property from the state, when he reaches adult age. This typically includes a residential property and villa to start a family as well as one or more (depending on the individual’s relationship with the royal family) income-generating properties for investment. This is probably by far the starkest difference from any other contract between a state and its citizens. Being a citizen in the UAE entails the right to be given assets, a right that both the state and its small group of citizens are eager to protect and not share with newcomers.

In addition, with the exception of ‘free zones’ the purchase of property is restricted to “Nationals”, giving them a distinct advantage over ‘Non-nationals’ in the creation of wealth. The dedication of free zones however is not in the power of the state, but the individual emirates and their rulers. Thus granting Non-nationals the right to buy and sell property is regulated at the local level. Dubai has been assertively adding free zones within its territory to attract foreign business and property investment. Abu Dhabi has done so to a lesser extent, but has added a number of areas recently both for industrial use and in areas zoned for high-end
luxury residential development. There are currently about 30 free zones in Dubai and 5 in Abu Dhabi. Outside of these free zones, foreign ownership of land is not permitted and foreign ownership of any commercial enterprise is restricted to 49%. This holds true for large oil extraction companies as well as for small businesses in downtown Abu Dhabi, many of which are run by foreigners and serve foreigners, but are “sponsored” by a local partner with a 51% or more share.

Another policy created to establish and maintain the citizen’s status vis-à-vis foreigners is the so-called “Emiratization Programme” that was introduced in the 1990s. The goal of the programme is to enforce quotas of Emirati workforce in the private sector. Currently 96% of the private sector workforce in Abu Dhabi is made up of non-nationals. In addition to outreach to national college graduates, job training and other incentives, the government is experimenting with fines for companies, which do not fulfil certain quotas of national employees.

The practice of preferring a citizen employee to a non-citizen is not uncommon in other places with a high percentage of immigrants. The United States for instance requires employers to certify that no equally qualified citizen was available for a given job. However, the scale of the challenge in the UAE is unique, with large demands for private and public sector workforce not being met by National jobseekers, who are unmotivated or unqualified for many of the jobs that migrants fill and continue to prefer public sector work.

Many of these policies and practices have been developed to maintain control over resources, and to promote Emirati identity and culture. Being a relatively young country, the UAE cannot draw from centuries of establishing an identity, but is actively constructing it in part as a way of strengthening the legitimacy of its rulers and the political system. Being Emirati is being a member of a small exclusive group. In a survey conducted in 2002, 30 years after the founding of the country, Christopher Davidson asked 250 male UAE respondents from different emirates, what best identifies them. 79% answered UAE/Emirati, 17% gave an Emirati-specific response such as “Dubai” or “Abu Dhabi”, and 4% answered Arab. Manifesting a distinct national identity strengthens the political system of the monarchy and while early symbols of this identity were the establishment of the national flag, national anthem, national university among other symbolic acts, the recent urban planning documents highlight “Emirati villas” and “Emirati neighbourhoods” promoting an Emirati way of living in the city. Urban citizenship

As suggested earlier, the concept of citizenship as an exclusive membership of a nation-state is being questioned by the increase of global movement and transnational relationships, where the nation-state may no longer be the appropriate scale to define citizenship. At the same time the concept of the city as a primary political community has gained momentum in recent years. Urban citizenship as membership in a political community of choice is yet another territorial scale that can define a body of rights that a citizen enjoys.

It is important to distinguish between formal citizenship of the nation-state and the exercise of urban citizenship through the practice of appropriation. In Lefebvre’s view of participation, “urban inhabitation directly confronts national citizenship as the dominant basis for political membership” (Purcell, 2002). However, urban citizenship does not replace or negate national citizenship. Instead it is a membership received through the practice of living in the city. It proposes a political identity (inhabitation) that is both independent of and prior to nationality with respect to the decisions that produce urban space (Brown & Kristiansen, 2009). Urban inhabitation coupled with human rights then confer a set of rights to those living in the city regardless of nationality, race, sex, religion or income. “Regardless of nationality” becomes a critical point of reference in the context of migrant workers living in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The above-mentioned policies and programmes, many of which are local policies, are examples that specifically promote Nationals and their economic wellbeing, national identity and cultural heritage and in doing so create a separate set of rights for citizens of the nation-state than for non-citizens. At the urban scale, some urban citizens have different rights to access the city than others, namely the right to own property wherever they please.

The concept of urban citizenship has been further developed in recent years by scholars and at several public debates initiated by UNESCO and UN Habitat as a joint project on “Urban Policies and the Right to the City: Rights, Responsibilities and Citizenship”. At the core of these debates is the understanding that we need to recognize urban citizenship and the social, environmental, and human rights inherent to it built on ideas of the right to the city. This citizenship is not a legal framework extended to someone based on a particular law, but rather a practiced form of citizenship conferred through actively living in the city. While there are initiatives like “The European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City”, “The City Statute of Brazil” or “The Montréal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities”, there is not yet an international consolidated approach to inclusive urban legislation and governance. Instead, the UNESCO project promotes the identification of best policies and practices to guide the debate and forging consensus among key actors on the constituent elements of public policy and legislation that combine urban development with social equity and justice (Colin, 2005).

With specific reference to migrants, the right to the city is the “right of all citizens to access the benefits a city has to offer, based on the principles of solidarity, freedom, equity, dignity, and social justice” (Balbo, 2009). Host communities however are often reluctant to grant such rights to
migrants given their limited commitment and contribution to civic life. This is certainly the case in the cities of the United Arab Emirates, where immigration policies and urban planning discourage migrants from permanently settling and from investing financially and emotionally in the city of their residence.

Spatial and social fragmentation

Space and the planning of urban spaces play an important role in promoting access to the benefits a city has to offer to all its citizens. In addition to state and local policies that concern property rights and labour laws delineating Nationals from Non-nationals, a number of specific immigration laws coupled with urban development policies further segregate urban citizens into different groups with different abilities to access, occupy and use the city.

The vast majority of migrants to the UAE, close to 2 million people are from India. Given the long-standing ties with India, this number includes a great variety of Indian citizens from “Indian Arabs” - those whose ancestors migrated to the lower gulf long before the formation of the UAE, to Indian merchants and engineers as well as a large number of unskilled contract labourers. The group includes approximately 33,000 Indian millionaires according to a 2005 Khaleej times article.6 Indians have been present in the coastal villages of the gulf for centuries. By the late 18th century, “pearling” became a lucrative industry in the region that brought many foreigners. Most were crewmen, but also skilled merchants came from India who similar to today took their annual leave and their profits back to India once a year. Often these merchants would also venture into other trades such as tailor or shopkeeper, contributing to the urban life and economy with a variety of businesses. Wealthy Indian merchants who possessed British passports had exclusive rights to the growing markets in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, while at the same time not being subject to local taxes as a result of the trucial agreements signed in 1820 with the British Navy. In the early 20th century, pearling was a multi-million dollar industry and Abu Dhabi Town had emerged as the capital of the lower gulf with over 400 boats in its fleet, a population of 6,000 approximately 10% of which were foreigners ( Lorimer, 1915). Given this longstanding presence in the region, Indians have a well-established network of cultural institutions, schools and social circles.

The second largest group is from Pakistan with an estimated 1.2 million people.7 Pakistanis in the gulf have long dominated the transport sector and contribute to the country's economy with more than 6,000 companies.8 Other large groups come from Bangladesh (est. 600,000), Iran (est. 400,000), Sri Lanka (est. 300,000), Egypt (est. 300,000), and the Philippines (est. 280,000). The largest group of foreigners from a western country are British with over 100,000. An increasingly large Chinese population of over 150,000 has over time developed a significant presence in Dubai's Chinatown. While many of the early migrants came from neighbouring Arab countries, the vast majority now is Asian. Most of these groups have formed their own cultural institutions and networks, and have established schools and civic groups separate from each other. In addition to divisions into different nationalities with their different institutions and networks, Jane Rhys, in her paper “A Lexicon of Migrants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)” describes how various visa status correspond with living arrangement and commonly used terms for different income groups. These terms unintentionally reveal a significant correlation between national immigration policies and spatial practices in the city that segregate different income groups spatially from each other. “Contract labourers” are typically employed in construction, municipal cleaning crews, building maintenance, agriculture, and road works. They are Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Indian, and recently but in smaller numbers, Nepalese and Chinese. Contract labourers are assumed to have been recruited by labour agencies in their home countries and to have little education. They must live in labour camps and are transported to and from job sites (Rhys, 2010). Salaries for contract labourer in construction range from 350 Dirhams (95 US Dollars) to 1000 Dirhams (273 US Dollars) a month. People referred to as “Workers” in visa terms also may be contracted to an industrial cleaning firm or municipality, but most are sponsored through the kafeel or kafala system that allows Emirates to obtain visas for employees.9 They live in urban centres, most commonly

sharing space in apartment buildings. Many of these sponsored workers are female, who work in shops, as maids in hotels, or serve food in restaurants. One qualification these employees have over contract labourers is the ability to speak English. Domestic workers usually reside with the sponsoring family, be they Emirati or foreign. The salary range in this category goes from the low end of 600 to 700 Dirhams per month (roughly 160 to 190 US Dollars) to several thousand per month. Both types of visas have been subject to immense abuse. Recruitment agencies often extort illegal fees from migrant willing to work in the gulf (Human Rights Watch, 2006 and 2009), while the kafala system has encouraged the creation of “ghost employers”, who sponsor a foreigners visa for a fee, but do not actually offer employment.

Foreigners who earn more than 4,000 Dirhams per month (approx. 1,100 US Dollars) are permitted to sponsor family members and bring them into the country. Family members that can be sponsored include spouse, children, stepchildren and dependent parents. This group includes middle-income and high-income professionals from a cross section of professions and countries of origin. They find housing in the private real estate market, increasingly in -often illegal- subdivisions of villas, built in neighbourhoods developed for Emirati families. In some cases, their employer will provide accommodation as part of their salary package.

In common language, the word “worker” typically refers to a low-income person of any kind, whereas “expatriate” is often used for highly skilled foreigners or when referred to foreigners in general. These correlations between visa type, income and living arrangement, limit the ability of migrants to interact across groups, to exchange and form relationships or political communities beyond their isolated income and cultural groups. While spatial distribution into low-income and high-income neighbourhoods is of course a common phenomenon in most cities, the urban planning tools and policies developed for housing, transportation, public space and services severely limit many foreigners to participate in, contribute to and benefit from the urban culture that is being developed through their own labour. The following pages describe some of these policies and practices in more detail and examine, how these relate to or conflict with the concept of the “Right to the City”.

Workers residential cities

In the past decade increased international attention was drawn to the large-scale construction projects in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Dubai was marketing itself as a major tourist destination for leisure and shopping with the construction of mega-projects such as the palm-shaped island Jumeirah, the Mall of the Emirates or the Burj Khalifa, the tallest structure in the World. Abu Dhabi began to develop its own identity as a place of culture, learning and sustainability inviting world-class architects like Norman Foster, Frank Gehry, Zaha Hadid and Jean Nouvel to design icons for this new identity. Media coverage for these projects attracted attention for conditions of the millions of foreign workers, who work in construction to complete these plans. Human Rights Watch has been the most vocal advocate with two full reports (2006, 2009) and regular updates on migrant’s rights in the UAE. Committed to improving its human rights record, the government of Abu Dhabi and subsequently the national government took a series of initiatives to respond to allegations of human rights violations, among them the decision to provide decent accommodation. First incorporated as principals in its 2007 development plan, the Plan Abu Dhabi 2030 Urban Structure Framework Plan, it was followed by a series of design guidelines and eventually a national law requiring all contract workers to be moved to such accommodation by 2013.

The 2007 Master plan for Abu Dhabi marked the first attempt to proactively address the provision of housing for the large population of contract labourers by setting out a series of principles for worker accommodations. Developed by the Higher Corporation for Specialized Economic Zones (Zonescorp), a government agency responsible for economic development, it requires employers to provide six major facilities to the workers: transportation, decent accommodation, drinking water, food, first aid units and recreation centres in so-called “workers’ residential cities”. The initial guidelines for building accommodations for 800,000 workers developed in 2007 (Zonescorp, 2007) divided these developments into three categories based on types of employment and the anticipated life-span necessary to accommodate different types of employees (construction being seen as a temporary activity and therefore housing for construction workers is seen as temporary as well).

Category I, or “permanent workers residential cities” are designed to house workers in the industrial sector. They are leased for 30 years to the employing company with the option of renewal and are typically located in close proximity to the workplace. A typical residential city is to be occupied by a mix of workers (60%), technicians (20%) and supervisors (20%), each being allocated a personal space of 6m2, 10 m2 and 20m2 respectively. Structures are made out of prefab concrete and are allowed to be up to 4 stories high. Category II, or “construction workers residential cities” are leased to construction companies for the duration of 10 years with the option to renew. Due to their more temporary nature, these structures are built in steel and the allocation of personal space is much smaller. To address the shortage of temporary housing for construction workers, Category III is the so-called “fast-track residential city”. Built as a mobile city out of containers on the construction site, these cities are commissioned for up to four years.

At the time of the field research in January 2011, several of these workers residential cities had been completed and in operation primarily in the Industrial City Abu Dhabi (ICAD) and near Al Mafraq, in a desert area
about one hour drive from downtown Abu Dhabi. Here, developers are in the process of building housing and amenities for 150,000 workers, divided over two developments called “Workers City 1” and “Workers City 2”. In 2011, much of the housing in both developments was completed or nearly complete and about half of it was occupied. Between dormitories, some of the infrastructure and public amenities such as a large mosque, retail and a clinic were under construction. Vacant patches of land indicated planned central squares or communal facilities, however, at the time of the field visit, no construction for these public spaces was underway. Instead these central areas were undeveloped, unmaintained and filled with garbage.

These workers residential cities are notably in the middle of the desert, they appear on no official city map and can be found best by following the caravan of buses and minivans that transport workers from their construction sites on the distant islands to their accommodations in the desert during the early evening hours.

The nearest town, Al Mafraq can be reached on foot, a 45-min walk through the desert and crossing a highway. There is no public transportation available to go to Abu Dhabi proper or anywhere for that matter other than the taxis and minivans, driven by fellow inhabitants, who work for taxi companies.

In fact a national law signed in 2009 explicitly states that workers accommodations should be built at least 5km away from any family residence. Large groups of male congregating in public spaces outside their dormitories were perceived as a threat to family-oriented Emirati neighbourhoods and therefore should be placed out of sight. (The high demand for labour created a gender imbalance in the country of 3 to 1 and the workers cities do not accommodate female workers or families.) Cabinet Decision 13 of 2009 as this law is called followed up on standards developed by Zonescorp and makes specific recommendations for site planning that have implications for urban planning decisions. In addition to keeping a distance from other residential districts, the law also states that “the site should be far from major tourist roads/arteries and from existing investment compounds, whether of tourist or commercial nature” further distancing inhabitants of these labour accommodations from other groups in the city and limiting their ability to access, occupy and use other parts of the city. Instead the site planning standards in the law provide that “The site should preferably be close to industrial areas or areas presenting job opportunities with a buffer zone in between.” While access to employment should be an important factor in locating housing, this requirement legitimizes the placement of these accommodations in industrial areas near potentially polluting industries, and far from recreational or cultural resources. Administrative resources such as government offices or embassies. The spatial needs of heavy industries are very different from those of residences.

Street networks in industrial areas are typically built to accommodate an extensive amount of truck traffic with no sidewalks or street tree planting to mitigate dust and emissions. Land use planning for these areas does not include parks or other recreational spaces. Instead the site planning recommendations established in Cabinet Decision 13 of 2009 explicitly force low-income worker accommodations to the margins of the city and in doing so limit their inhabitants’ ability to access, occupy and use the city. The realities of Worker City 1 and 2 in Al Mafraq illustrate how such policies are put to practice. None of the 150,000 workers who will live here, when the two cities are complete will live near any job opportunities. Most are transported to and from construction sites with an average commute of more than an hour. The nearest neighbours of these two compounds are a wastewater treatment facility, a prison and an army air base.

In Lefebvre’s view “The right to the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: The right to freedom, to individualism in socialization, to habitat and dwelling. The right to the œuvre of the city, to participation and to appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property) are implied in the right to the city” (Elden, 2004). Lefebvre described the right to appropriation as the right to access, occupy and use urban space, and the right to create new space that meets the people’s need. Planning policies such as the site standards for labour accommodations severely limit this right to appropriation. While it is not prohibited in any way for foreign labourers to access, occupy and use public spaces, parks and beaches in other parts of Abu Dhabi the mandatory spatial distance of their residences from such spaces does de facto deny them the right to “appropriate” these public spaces. The majority of contract labourers cannot choose their own living arrangement, and therefore are confined to compounds such as the one in Al Mafraq and its public spaces and resources. According to the city’s Surface Transport master plan, a tramline will eventually connect Worker City 1 and 2 with the rest of the city by 2030. Until then, workers who would like to travel to other parts of Abu Dhabi, have to hire taxis or minivans or walk. The remote location of their accommodation has significant consequences for workers to protect their human rights. Administrative offices such as their embassies, the complaints department of the Ministry of Labour and the Shari’a Court are all long travel distances away from most labour accommodations and not open on Fridays, their only day off (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The importance of location of housing is described as part of the right to adequate housing as expressed in several international documents. Among the most significant of these is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which determines that “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.” The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
which monitors the International Covenant issued a comment in 1991 to clarify its meaning elaborating on issues such as security of tenure, availability of services, material, facilities and infrastructure, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location and cultural adequacy. With respect to location the committee identifies: “The location of adequate housing, whether urban or rural, must permit access to employment opportunities, health care, schools, child care and other social facilities. To protect the right to health of the occupants, housing must also be separated from polluted sites or pollution sources.” (University of Michigan, Human Rights Library, 1992). The United Arab Emirates have not signed the covenant, but given the government’s expressed interest in improving its own human rights record, a closer look at the policies to improve access to adequate housing reveals the selective approach to do so. The planning and construction of workers residential cities spatially and socially segregated from other parts of the city provides a technocratic solution to a human rights issue. While addressing some of the rights mentioned in the covenant such as drinking water, decent shelter, facilities and infrastructure, it violates others such as access to employment opportunities, schools or social facilities.

Figure 4: Abu Dhabi: Major roads and location of Worker Cities

Spaces of inclusion/exclusion

Trying to avoid the negative connotations of the word “camp”, the new labour accommodations are referred to as “workers residential cities” or “workers cities”; a misconception of the word “city” with its etymological root in civitas = “citizenship, condition or rights of a citizen,” later “community of citizens, state, commonwealth.” At the very least it further defines what a city is and the kinds of rights and organization we associate with the idea of “city”. Workers City 2 for instance consists of eleven “cities”, distributed over four square-shaped areas, each surrounded by a wide public road. The eleven “cities” are in fact eleven units under different management, so “city” here refers to an area under the control of a particular management company. The management companies provide maintenance, security, laundry services and food. Employers of the workers pay rent and services at 800 Dirham ($218) per person. These costs, which tend to be slightly higher than previous arrangements are the most common reason for reluctance on the employers’ part to move in. Interviews with workers suggested that these new accommodations were an appreciated improvement over previous informal arrangements, which where not built and equipped according to government issued standards.

At the time of the field visit, none of the eleven “cities” was fully occupied. Raha Village, the most developed of the eleven units housing 43,000 workers, offered insight into the design and planning principles for these cities. Public spaces were under 24-hour camera surveillance, the entire unit was fenced in and ID cards were needed to enter and exit. Streets were clean and although for the most part were used by pedestrians only, were built for vehicular traffic with narrow sidewalks. The compound also featured one mosque, one indoor recreation room with a television set and one courtyard planted with palm trees, green lawn and benches for outdoor passive recreation. Two small kiosks on the sidewalks were open to buy snacks and cigarettes.

Leaving aside naming conventions, the concept of these accommodations as smaller urban units under different management again challenges our notion of citizenship as a form of membership and inclusion in a community. Here, the boundaries of the compound physically exclude anyone, who does not live inside the boundaries, be it for a personal visit, for selling oranges or for joining a group of cricket players. All of these activities happen outside of the gates in-between different compounds. These in-between spaces, technically outside of the boundaries of any of the eleven cities are in fact the spaces where urban citizenship is exercised by actively living in the city. These are the public spaces most frequented by workers to meet, buy and sell fruits or to play cricket. They are undesigned, unmaintained, strewn with garbage and, with the exception of road infrastructure, undeveloped. No trees or structures provide shade. These spaces present a vacuum in jurisdiction. Those managing the various workers cities have an interest in attracting tenants and are obliged to meet government minimum standards. As a result, inside the gates streets are clean, rubbish bins are everywhere, maintenance and security is diligent. Outside of the gates however is where residents are included in the city, where they can act on their urban citizenship and occupy and use space to meet their needs in spite of the harsh barriers.

Online Etymology Dictionary

14. The United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs website states: “The Government is firmly committed to promoting in a constructive way the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is determined to improve its own domestic record and to make a positive difference at the global level.”

15. Online Etymology Dictionary
variety of regions to accommodate the differences in tastes and customs of a diverse group of workers, they do not cater to personal favourites or can account for special occasions such as birthdays or other celebrations.

At the time of the field visit, an interesting dilemma between government regulations and cultural practice had ensued around individual laundry and clotheslines. Government regulations do not permit any visible clotheslines on the premises of these labour accommodations. It is viewed as an unsightly sign of the cramped labour camps these new cities were meant to replace. Most workers from India, Nepal and Bangladesh however refuse to use the provided laundry services for their underwear and prefer to wash it themselves. Management companies had to concede to this practice and in order to not violate government regulations identify areas, where laundry could be hung out to dry without being visible from any public street surrounding the compound. The process of arriving at this solution as banal and small as it may seem, demonstrates an example of how the residents acted on their right to the city. In ignoring rules and hanging their personal laundry outside their residences they exercised their right and freedom to appropriate and use space as urban citizens collectively and through this act forced a dialogue with planners and managers to come to a mutually agreeable solution. Through practice (not protest) they were able to participate in the decision-making process. The right to wash your personal laundry is of course a small victory given the great inequities with respect to access to the city that many of these workers face, it does however represent a model that would have the potential to be replicated in other areas (for instance the accommodation of cooking or recreational spaces) in order to respect the freedoms and rights of inhabitants of these cities.

*Figure 5: Gates to Worker City*

*Cabinet Decision No. 9* also sets standards for certain services and recreational spaces to be provided in each "city". For instance "Courts should be provided for the workers who wish to exercise in their free time." Design guidelines issued concurrently with the law recommend 4m2 per person for outdoor recreation. None of the areas visited in Al Mafraq provided space large enough to accommodate such requirements. Instead, one manager offered in an interview that he was hoping to build cricket fields in the desert areas just beyond the boundaries of his compound. Similarly, other services such as barber shops, grocery stores or access to ATM machines are commonly being constructed in areas outside of the fences of any particular compound accessible to all residents. These spaces provide opportunities for interaction and encounter for workers from different compounds, different countries or different employment sectors. The law states that such retail services should only be open to residents of the labour accommodation and not the general public. In practice, this is not enforced and there seems to be little need to do so. The remoteness of these labour accommodations gives little incentive for anyone but residents to shop in these areas. The law explicitly notes, "In case a grocery store exists, it shall not be allowed to sell food that spoil fast or that needs to be cooked before consumption". While this statement may be born out of a valid concern for health and safety inside the residential rooms and is meant to discourage the preparation and storage of food in rooms that are not equipped for it, it also implicitly restricts choices in lifestyle and opportunities to gather for cooking. Some workers interviewed appreciated the range of food choices in the new mess halls and were content with not having to cook for themselves after moving into the new worker city. Others however saw the ability to cook a meal together as a social activity and felt restricted in their lifestyles as a community. While the mess halls provide food options from a

*Figure 6: Public Spaces outside the Gates of Worker Cities*
**Housing within the city**

It should be noted that this type of housing in “workers residential cities” accommodates only those workers, whose employers provide housing for them based on their contract. For the most part, these are workers in heavy industries, landscaping, security and construction working for large companies. There is currently very little planning underway that addresses the housing needs of the low to middle income workers, who do not receive housing through their employer. They rent “bedspace” in the many crumbling apartment buildings that were the result of rapid development of downtown Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the 1970s and 1980s. Nationals, who received these properties through the Khalifa Committee as income generators, own much of this dilapidating downtown building stock. The Khalifa Committee was created in 1976 to formalize and manage the process by which the government would distribute its income to its citizens. The Khalifa Committee would not only disperse the property, but also be responsible for design and construction. As a result of massive development in the 1970s and 1980s, downtown Abu Dhabi was developed under this program at great speed. Large blocks are lined with 20-story buildings, the interior of these block are often filled with developments of 3 to 6 stories. These buildings, many of which are now a mere 30 years old are nevertheless in dilapidating conditions. There is little incentive for property owners to upkeep these buildings, since there are limited opportunities to sell property (Elsheshtawy, 2009). A perpetual housing shortage for this group of low to low-middle income workers keeps rents as well as tenant turnover high. Walls in public spaces are often covered with offers for a bedspace for 400 to 600 Dirhams, (110 to 160 US Dollars).

**Figure 7: Postings for Bedspaces in Downtown Abu Dhabi**

Being central in the city, these residents are not spatially excluded from the city by long distances and lack of public transport. They live in and contribute to the urban life that unfolds as a result of their presence in these neighbourhoods. Here a different pattern of social or psychological exclusion emerges as result of the city’s urban planning efforts and desire to develop “an authentic and safe but also progressive and open Arab city; a personality garnered from the desert and the sea; a traditional way of life but with the latest 21st century options; and a place of business but also of government and culture” (Abu Dhabi Plan 2030).

Yasser Elsheshtawy in his essay on Abu Dhabi gives an example of how these greater development goals lead to the exclusion of a large portion of the population. He describes the process of planning, demolishing and rebuilding the Central Market in downtown Abu Dhabi. The central market, originally built in the 1970s based on models of a typical Arab Souq, was a lively and chaotic place, where many foreign shop owners offered their wares in small spaces that were affordable to these small merchants (Elsheshtawy 2009). Their customer base were foreign workers, both Arab and non-Arab. Although built in a typical fashion of the 1970s – modern and in concrete- it was a symbol of “old Abu Dhabi” and stood for the maintenance of traditional Arab values promoted by Abu Dhabi’s ruler Sheikh Zayed. Early plans to remodel the market incorporated this thinking and developed designs that would still allow for small shop owners to rent shops in a renovated space. After 2004 however, with a new ruler and a new architect, these original ideas were replaced with a design for a luxury mall. The design by internationally known architect Norman Foster incorporated design details that resembled oriental ornaments to give the project an Arab look, however neither small shop owners nor their customers were able to return to the new central market, which opened in 2011. Similar stories can be told about numerous large blocks in downtown Abu Dhabi, where businesses and residents are being displaced by new luxury development. A lower income population, which used to fill the centre of the city with life, is increasingly marginalized through such symbolic exclusion. They cannot afford the products in the new malls or the apartments in the new residential towers and are disappearing from these areas (and with them a lively streetscape). Ironically, several observers of the demographic imbalances in GCC states, when commenting on the threat to Emirati identity, this imbalance may pose, point out that the development of luxury malls and the evolution into a consumer society appears to be the much greater threat to Emirati values, which were defined by frugal desert life and nomadic culture a generation ago (Forstenlechner and Rutledge, 2011; Kapiszewski, 2006).

The example of the Central Market points to a critical challenge the ruler of Abu Dhabi faces, attempting to preserve and promote local identity and culture. In most cities, the built environment has contributed over
centuries to portraying and manifesting the culture and identity of their citizens. Architecture has been developed according to local climate and local cultural and religious practices and the built environment becomes a visible manifestation of such local identity. The young cities of the lower gulf and especially Abu Dhabi, do not share this history. Very few structures in Abu Dhabi 60 years ago were permanent structures and none are preserved. While the architects of the Central Market and similar projects are using an Arab vocabulary and imagery to evoke such identity, these images are not rooted in any urban or architectural history of the place. Elsheshawy noted that in fact the 1970s market with its many foreign shop owners was a symbol for “old Abu Dhabi”. Historical accounts of the early 20th century describe the market place as a place where only 10 out of 70 shops were Arab; others were Persian and Indian (Lorimer, 1915). In search for a distinct Emirati identity in the 21st century, the new shopping malls and luxury residential towers displace and exclude a diverse population that has historically contributed to the culture and identity of the place.

To counter this trend of displacement and in acknowledgement of the drastic housing shortage, the Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Council began to develop policies to address this shortage for low and low-middle income households. One strategy, released in 2010 is the so-called “Inclusionary Development”. This new policy requires 20% of the residential gross floor area (GFA) in multi-unit residential buildings within developer-led planned developments to be developed and managed as middle income rental housing, effectively stipulating the private development market to provide affordable housing. Rent prices are set between 25,200 AED and 88,200 AED (approximately $6,000 to $24,000) per year, which should be the equivalent to 35% of the tenant’s income (UPC, 2010). In addition, UPC staff act as advocates and consultants for the development of affordable housing. While there is clearly market demand, there is little desire among the development community to build anything but luxury residential. This has lead to an oversupply of large “Emirati villas”, a housing typology promoted by the Urban Planning Council. Many of these villas are subsequently subdivided—often illegally—rented out as smaller one or two-bedroom apartments to middle income foreigners.

In a second strategy to increase the amount of affordable housing for this group, employers are encouraged to move their employees into accommodations developed for specific industries. In one such example, the Tourism Development Investment Company (TDIC), a government agency, is developing housing for workers in the hotel sector. The concept is similar to the workers residential cities in that private companies build and manage the housing compound according to government standards and then lease it out to employers. The development for hotel workers will include 545 apartments of different sizes and will house approximately 35,000 people. The complex will house hotel staff at all levels including their families. Based on the model that the new national airline Etihad spearheaded, which built a complex of mixed-size apartments near the airport to house its entire staff from high-level executives to cleaning personal. TDIC believes that such housing will be an attractive alternative to workers and employers. The housing for hotel workers will be located in Al Mafraq as well, thus incurring similar issues for transportation to the workplace or any other urban destinations as the workers residential cities currently out there, spatially segregating yet another segment of the foreign-born workforce to the margins of the city.

Conclusion

The policies and practices described in this paper are driven by the “illusion of impermanence” that Myron Weiner described 30 years ago (Weiner, 1982). Each participant in the system, the various levels of government in the UAE, local employers and the migrants themselves view the migrants’ presence as a temporary phenomenon. While inclusion in the master plan and government decisions such as Cabinet Law No. 9 clearly recognize the existence of migrants and their need for adequate housing, the content and execution of these policies do not acknowledge the long-term consequences of spatially and socially marginalizing the majority of the urban population. One evident risk stemming from having such significant numbers of transient residents remains that there are no shared aspirations by this group for the future of the society (Forstenlechner and Rutledge, 2011). Questions not asked by policy makers and planners include: How much does this excessive growth and reliance on foreign workers actually benefit the average citizen? How does this growth with all its consequences contribute to the identity of the country and the city? Unemployment among Emiratis is at an all-time high of 20.8% according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Nationals prefer to be employed in the public sector where wages and benefits are higher, but productivity is low and jobs are often created not based on a need, but as a way to maintain political power and stability. Limiting the migrants’ right to access, occupy and use the city is born out of fear for how migrants may influence, challenge or transform the identity and culture of the host society and is justified with the migrants’ temporary presence. While the search for an authentic Emirati identity and the fear of losing such given the current demographic distribution is understandable, the very policies meant to protect such identity such as “Emiratization” or the concentration of single men in workers cities at the outskirts of the city undermine the social stability of the city and threaten the successful growth and development of Abu Dhabi into a modern city with a distinct identity over the long term. Given the current conditions for migrants, the individual migrant may be less likely to remain in the country for longer periods of time, but as a condition of the demographic breakdown in Abu Dhabi, migrants will continue to be present in great...
In most countries, immigration policies are defined and enforced by the nation-state at a national level, whereas immigrant policies, concerned with the existence of migrants in a local place are defined and enforced by a local authority, typically a regional or municipal government. Thus urban citizenship for migrants is by definition regulated independent of and prior to the nation-state. In Abu Dhabi, where political power of the city and the nation state rest with the same family, the recognition of urban citizenship as independent and prior to the nation-state as a base for urban inclusion may be especially challenging but even more powerful.

In order to develop and sustain an urban society, planners in Abu Dhabi will have to move away from technocratic solutions to more inclusive planning processes and acknowledgement of the rights of all actors in this urban society. Christopher Davidson argues that the stability of the political system, the federal monarchy, is guaranteed by the generous welfare system in place (Davidson, 2005). From the perspective of human rights and urban citizenship, it may be the greatest obstacle to progress and therefore the most dangerous threat to stability in the long term. Although the overwhelming majority of the population are foreigners, who do not directly benefit from the distribution of properties and payments, Davidson contends that generous salaries compared to the foreigners’ home countries and the absence of taxes are able to buy the support for the royal rulers from this large segment of the population. Global income inequalities supplemented by the absence of taxes certainly represent strong incentives for a continuous stream of foreigners of every income category to settle for the temporary status of non-citizen.

Yet, the generous welfare system does not empower those few that it intends to treat well. Uneducated and unable to compete for jobs, they rely on a few elites and majority of foreigners to plan and build the future of their city and country. At the same time, the spatial fragmentation of the large foreign population into smaller national groups further segregated into social groups or income strata who live spatially segregated, starkly contributes to the inadvertent acceptance of the political system. The urban policies in place for housing, transportation and public space limit residents in their ability to access, occupy and use the city and to claim their rights as urban citizens. As a result, they do not easily form coherent political communities, who would be able to negotiate the content of their contract with the government as urban citizens. Those, who do seek to act on their right as urban citizens and make claims, have been met in the past with deportation or imprisonment.

On its website the government of the United Arab Emirates states that it is mindful of its human rights record and “investing its energies in the bringing up to date of its own laws and practices.” The usefulness of the “Right to the City” concept however has not yet entered the human rights debate in this context. Deliberately planning for the urban inclusion of all citizens’ means effectively extending human rights, social protection and equal treatment to all inhabitants. Non-nationals may be excluded from certain privileges that Nationals enjoy, such as the allocation of property. However, recognizing Non-nationals as citizens of the city and granting them their right to the city may ultimately strengthen the identity and social stability of the growing city of Abu Dhabi. Recognizing urban citizenship, as a concept worth promoting and planning for may be the most effective tool for Abu Dhabi to improve its human rights record.
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